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ABSTRACT 
Price Behavior in Tight Oligopoly * 
The study examines price behavio r in t ight oligopoly. The inves-
tigation proceeds from the premise that tacit collus i on is the only 
rationa l response of firms comprising tigh t oligopoly . The study ' s 
thesis is that collusive conduct in tight oligopoly will : reflect one of 
two general pricing patte rns: (1) shared . monopoly pric i ng, or (2) ·. 
mark - up pricing. A unique empirical test of this dual price hypotheses 
i s develop ed . The test focuses on the nature of pr~ce responses to cost 
and demand changes as ref lected in a price equation that is estima t ed for 
each of forty-tw o four - d i git SIC industries . The study ' s results 
indicate infrequent, but still notable, instances of shared monopoly 
pricing. More common is evidence of mark-up pricing , a general catego r y 
within which demand p rov ed to be signif icant in roughly half of the 
industries examined~ Theoretical implications of these findings are 
dis cussed . 
*The autho r wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Peter Asch and 
Robert Schmidt , and the support of the Dupont Summer Fellowship program. 
This papAr examinco price ~ihavior in tight oligopoly. The investi-
gation proceeds from the commonly accepted premise that tacit collusion 
is the rational response of firms comprising oligopoly. Indeed, in this 
stµdy the collusive assumption . is adopted with special force. Theoreti-
cal and empirical research underscore the importance of high market 
concentration for effect .ive collusion (26 ] , (16], [12] . The empirical 
focusof this study is therefore limited to tight oligopoly. 
The study's thesis is that collusive conduct under tight oligopoly 
will reflect either of two general pricing patterns: (1) monopoly 
pricing; or (2) mark-up pricing . · The paper develops a test of this 
hypothesis and presents the empiric .al results. 
Section I ·briefly reviews the theories of shared monopoly and 
mark-up pricing as collusive models of oligopoly. Section U develops a 
target - return model of mark-up pricing. Section III demonstrates how 
mark-up and monopoly pricing can be distinguished empirically, a 
distinction which serve ·s as the basis for testable hypoth eses . Section 
IV describes the estimation procedure of a price equat ion and the empiri -
cal results appear in Section V. Section VI p r ese nts the study's con -
clusions. 
I. Two Views of Collusive Conduct 
The seminal dis _cussion of collusion under oligopoly is generally 
attributed to Chamberlin . ~hamberlin emphasized the inevitability of 
recognized interdependence and "thus the conclusion of a monopoly price 
for any fairly small number of sellers." [4, p.49] Of course, sub-
sequent works have emphasized that the actual practice of tacitly 
administering shared monopoly -fa .ces formidable technical problems 
(17], (30]. Briefl~, these problems arise from such factors as 
1 
interfirm cost differ.enc~s , market share allocat.i.ons, product differen-
tiation, and polici~g agreements. However, research also suggests that 
these complications are l ess significant in tight oligopoly. Selten 
(32], in a games setting, demonstrites the extreme sensitivity of the 
shared monopoly solution to the number of firms . Further, Shepherd [34] 
notes that incre ased imitation ·of product characteristics and l ocation is 
an increasingly rational strategy as the number of finn~ declines. It is 
also argued that the extreme · fewness of tight oligopoly offers a bett~r 
environment for maintaining tacit pr ice agreements. Tight oligopolists 
will perceive a lower incentive to cheat, an increased probability of 
detection, and stronger i ndustry social contracts [17], [23], [35]. 
Thus, it is reasonable to view the monopoly result as .a viable solution 
in tight oligopoly,.albeit, not the exclusive one. 
The appeal of collusion exists if there is a genuine prospect of 
economic profit, even though such profit falls short of -the monopoly 
return. This possibility suggest .s the need for a second - best modeling . of 
collusive 0 1 i.c:iopoly, and mark-up pricing has much to recommend it . For 
example, several case studies indicate that mark-up pricing i.s well 
su ited to the common pricing opjective of the individual firm [15) , [21) . 
Furthermore, mark-up pricing is a tangible and workable guide to parallel 
price conduct [18], [11). Ind eed , perhaps t_he most important attribute 
of mark - up ·pricing as a collusive device is its simplicity of implemen-
tation and verification [10). 
In sum, a dual interpretation of pricing · under tight oligopoly may 
be appropriate . • Monopoly price conduct should not be dismissed a 
prior~, and mark-up pricing appears to be a practical, second-best 
collusive solution. 
2 
II. 'rllE 'I/\HGET -RE'I'UHN MODEL 
This study o1dopts a "target-return" model o-f mark-up pricing . 1 
The foundation of the target-return model is a care f ul discussion of 
production cost . Figure 1 depicts unit cost (UTC) behavior summed by . 
factor type . Unit material costs (UMC) are shown as constant over almost 
the entire range of plant capacity for two reasons. Fir st, it is un-
reasonable to think of material usage as subject to the same laws of 
variable proportions as is often assumed for labor and capital. Second, 
under normal business conditions, materia .ls purchases in manufacturing 
tend to be forward contracted at fixed p r ices. 2 An excep t ion to constant 
UMC may arise, however, at very high levels of uti li zation . If high 
utilization rates for the firm correlate with robust economic activity in 
general, manufacturers may encounter material shortages. Unit mate r ial 
costs will rise if the firm resorts to higher ..:priced spot markets . This 
possibility is reflected in Figure la by the broken line rising . at 
9 . 3 roughly 5 percent capacity. 
Figure 1: Cost Structure in Manufacturi ng Indust r ies 
$ 
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Unit lab or costs (ULC) are shown first to decline, then level off, 
and finally rise as a plant expands productiori . Within eac~ · range, the 
cost pattern may be attributed to short-run productivity and/or wage 
be havior . · In the region of declining costs, both factors appear to be 
influential. While studies (40], (22] have found initially rising 
average labor productivity , declining ULC may also refect a wage bill 
phenomenon. · Owing to union strength in manufacturing, one may assume 
that even during periods of slack demand, wages are downwardly rigid. 
Furthermore, search and training costs may dictate the retention of 
4 
skilled workers during downturns. The net result is quasi-fixed wage 
bill and thus. a region of declining · ULC. In the intermediate range of 
production, say anything upward from 60 percent, one may expect further 
productivity gains to be modest . Furthermore, there is no reason to 
believe that wages shou ld change over this interval. These factors 
suggest a region of c;nsta~t unit l abor costs, although labor costs may 
rise near full capacity due to tightening labor markets and the payment 
of overtime rates. 
The interpretation of the unit capital cost (UKC) is the traditional 
one, declining throughout as a fixed expenditure is spread over succes-
sively higher levels of output. The unit cost structure shown in Figure 
1 is assumed typical of manufacturing industries. The only notable 
difference between thes e cost relations and the conventional textbook set 
is the region of constant marginal cost. There is, however, ample 
' 5 
empirical support for this adjustment. 
Under a target-return strateg y, the firm prices to achieve a desired 
rate of return on its capital in vestment, defined here as net expendi-
tures on plant and equipment. A target~return model typically does not 
4 
n include labor or materials costs in the rQte base . The predictions of 
the target-ret .urn model follow from the assumption that the f_irm sets 
price · relative to the unit costs incurred at a normal level of plant 
utilization. Unit costs at that poi nt are commonly referred to as 
7 
"standard volume " costs. The formal target-return equation is written: 
Pt = UVC + (l+r) UKC · 
S S · 
(1) 
where ~tis the ~arget price, r · is the target rate of return, ands 
denotes the standard volume output . This eq uation, in conjunction with 
the cost structure developed e~rlier, constitutes a target-return model . 
The model is presented graphically in Figure 2 . Note that price Pt is 
set as a mark - up over unit costs ca l culated for illustrative purposes at 
80 percent of plant capacity. Specifically, the terms UVC and UKC in 
5 S 
the equation correspond to the vertical di s ta nces ce and be, resp~c ~ 
tively . The expression {l+r)UKC is equal to ac, or alternatively, the 
. s ' 
distance ab is equal to r {UKC). The latter magnitude may be interpreted 
s 
as the actual dollar mark~up per unit . 
The targe t -r eturn model represents a unique supply and demand 
framework . As drawn here, the position of the demand curve DD implies 
that the firm will just sell its standard volume outp ut at the target 
price ang thus attain its desired return . More appropriately, however, 
DD should be und e rstood as a notional demand curv e -- the demand which 
the firm estimates for its product during the pricing decision. Of 
course , realized demand · is likely to be above or below standard output. 
Iri the event that notional and realized demands differ only slightly, the 
firm is believed to maintain its normal operating rate by adjusting 
inventories accordingly. For wider deviations , the firm will make 
quantity adjustments _ within a production run. The cent ral point i s that 
5 
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once the fil:lll sets . t he target price, t he supply curve is a horizontal 
interval at that pr .ice. I n Figure 2, the l e ngth SS denotes the supply 
interval. 
This concept of a supply interval has direct implications r egardi ng 
whether the firm actually achieves its target profit. Recall that the 
target rate of return is applied to UKC. However, actual UKC, and thus 
s 
the actual rate of return, will vary depending upon where the realized 
demand curve intersects the supply interva .l. To the extent that DD cuts 
to either side of point a, the firm will do slightly better or worse than 
targeted. In short, there i s nothing inviolate about the target rate 
, , ' 
which firms apply in their price formula. Like any target , it can be 
aimed for and missed . Indeed, it seems .qui te reasonable that firms will 
have good and bad years , jus t as the model suggests . 
One final comment re garding · the interpretation of Figure 2 involves 
the distinction between the broken versus solid segments of the supply 
interval. Over the length Sh, price (Pt) is ·less than unit total cost 
(UTC) and thus the firm is suffering losses. This segment is inclu ded 
within the supply interval, however, because price is still greater than 
unit variable costs (UVC). A further implication of this segment is that 
it may represent the range of operations ovet which price agreements are 
most apt to break down. The model is thus compatible with the common 
view that collusion is less likely in declining industries. The inclu -
sion of the second broken segment, kS, may be less appropraite. Over 
this small range, variable costs are rising so dramatically that they 
begin , to cut substantially into the firms' previously profitable posi -
tion. ·Therefore , it may be more accurate to truncate the supply interv al 
6 
at point k , r e asoning t hat orcl 0rs beyond t his point are eit her not 
accepted or are a~~signed e xt ended deliv e ry dates. Alternati ,vely, firns 
may ope r ate in this less p r ofitable r ange with the longer - tenn interest 
of insuring good cus t ome~ rel a tion s, es pecial ly if the boom demand is 
perceived as t emporary . Generally speaking, however, the slight differ-
ence between SS and Skis trivial to the analysis. "In presenting the 
hypotheses , SS is de emed the relevant supply interva l . 
III. THE HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses and empirical test focus on the resp ons iveness of 
price to changes in short-run cost and demand factors. . The hypotheses 
are specified in terms of a general price equation: 
(2) p · = a.- + 81 {UVC)_ + 82 (Dd) 
where Pis unit price, UVC is unit variable cost, and Dd is a demand 
variable . This section demonstrates that shared-monopoly · pricing and 
tar get - return pricing offer empirically distinguishable predictions for 
the coefficients 81 and S2 . 
Figure 3 illustrates the price responses of the two models to 
changes in marginal costs . To f acili tate comparisons , the diagrams are 
contriv ed such that ident i cal cost curves (MC = UVC) yield initially 
identical pr ices (Pm= Pt) . Now consider an equal increase in cost in 
each model, e.g . , a shift fr om MC to MC' a!')d UVC to UVC'. Joint-profit 
maximization re quires that the industry reduce output fro m Q to Q' and 
raise price from P to P ' . Precisely how much price adjus ts vis-a - vis 
m m 
8 
output depends largely upon the elasticity of industry demand. Elimina -
ting the extremes of per fectly elastic and inelastic demand curves , it is 
~leijr that 81 must li e between zero and one. 
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Within a target-return model, the firm is understood to change 
prices when it recognizes a permanent change in its standard volume unit 
cos~. For instanc .e, the firm would know . . to adjust its standard cost 
figure in the wake of a labor settlemen~ or an announcement from suppliers 
that materials prices were to be increased . Under a target-return 
strategy, permanent cost increases are passed along . fully in prices . 9 
This price response is shown in the right-hand diagram in Figure 3. In 
effect, the entire cost structure has shifted vertically by the amount of 
the unit variable cost change (cc ' = bb' = · aa') . The net result is that 
the target price is raised equally, from Pt to Pt ' A pure target - return 
model thus predi~ts that 81 wi ll be equal to one. 
The analysis may now easily be expanded to include the implications 
of " full - cost" price behavior . Earlier it was noted that the major 
distinction between full - cost and target - return pricing is simply whether 
unit variable cost is considered part of the rate base. In equation 
form, the full - cost price (Pf) is expressed 
( 3) == (l+r) (UVC + UKC ) 
s s 
as distinct from ·the previous target price equation 
{ 1) P = UVC + (l+r) UKC 
t s s 
The implication of equation (3) for the hypotheses is t hat 81 will be 
g r eater than one. Indeed, the difference between 81 an~ unity should 
provide an estimate of the make- up factor r. In sum, the size of B1 will 
indicate the pricing model followed by the industry - - a B1 significa nt l y 
less than unity corroborates the shared monopoly model, exactly unity a 
target-return model, and greater than unity a full-cost scheme. 
8 
$ 
p.
 m
 
p m
 
D
' 
Sh
ar
ed
 
H
on
o
po
ly
 
Ta
q;
ec
-
R
ec
u
r
n
 
$ 
D
 
p 
E'
 • 
C 
' 
C 
H
C 
C
,
 
"
-
,
 
O
' 
I 
D
 
I 
e
,
 
Q 
Q'
 '
M
R
 
M
R'
 
Qu
an
t 
it)
" 
60
 
80
 
62
 >
 0
 
B2
 ~ 
o
 
F
ig
ur
e 
4:
 
Pr
ic
e 
R
es
po
ns
es
 
to
.
 
O
em
u
n
d 
Ch
an
·
ge
s 
•s
l UTC
 
-
-
·
 
u
vc
 
"
D
 
10
0 
Ca
p,
1,
·
 
i C
V 
U
ti 
l i
ZJ
C 
i!J
tl 
Turn now to figure 4 where the price pre dictions for demand changes 
are illustrated . In terms of equation- (2), we are interest~d in the 
value of the coefficient 82 . As was the case in Figu re 3, the graph~ are 
drawn such that equilibrium price and output are identic al in both model s 
pr i or to a shift in demand. It is evident from the di agrams that , 
following _a shift ·in demand, the joint - profit maximizi ng result il:1 unique 
from the target-return prediction. In the latter case , .the firm's 
short - run response is purely an output adjustmen t within the supply 
interval. Thus the coefficient 82 is pre~icted to be zero (Pt= Pt'). 
1n contrast , an industry that is m~ximizing joint - profits should display 
a 82 greater than zero. 
Combining the foregoing discussions of Figure 3 and 4, the f orma l 
hypotheses are as follows: 
Hl: 0 < 81 < 1 and 82 > 0 + shared monopoly 
H2: 81 = 1 and 82 = 0 + target - return pri cing 
H3: 8 > 1 and 82 = 0 + full - cos t pricing 1 
where 61 and 82 are the coefficients of the unit variable cost and demand 
variables in a price equation. 
IV . ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
The data for this study are from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. 
The data are 1958 - 1976 annual observations for price and production · 
variables for 42 four - digit industries as defined in the 1972 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes . The qualifying cha r acteristic for 
the sample is fewness , either in an absolute or relative sense . The 
sample in dustries and detai l s of the selection .criteria · appear in the· 
Appendix. 
9 
Since the middl°c 1960 ' s, consideri'!ble empirical work has been done 
~ith the price equ~tion in manufacturing industries. Notable ~tudies are 
those by Eckstein [6], Schultz~ and Tryon (31.l, .Eckstein and Fromm (7], 
Eckst ein and Wyss iB }, Godley and Nordhaus (14], Ripley and Segal (29 ], 
Wilde r (39] , and Qualls (28} . However, the specific forms of the equa -
tion developed _in ·most of these studies are only ind'irectly applicable 
here. The present study e xamines fou r- digit SIC industries with annua l 
observations as compared wi th the quarterly data and broader . two- or 
three-digit aggregation of prior studies. This distinction influences 
the estimation procedure in two notable respects. 
First, annual data obviate the need for lags when modeling the speed 
of adjustment between variable cost changes and prices. This is a 
valuable simplification, since there is no strong agreement within the 
· 10 quarterly studies .upon the appropriate lag structure. Estimates range 
from no lag to a six month lag, with a three to four month gestation 
' 11 perhaps the most tenable. Whatever the adjustment lag is, it is 
apparently well within the sphere of annual data, thus indicat i ng no need 
for a lagged element in the equatio n. Furthermore , it is conceivable 
that as many as three variable cost changes may be captured within one 
year's price datum . These are important implications to emphasize. They 
bode well for the probable sensitivity of annual price data in capturing 
variable cost changes. 
A second distinction between this study and most prior research 
concerns the operat ional definition of " standard" costs . Recall that 
under target-return pricing · firm s are perceived to base prices upon unit 
cost incurred at "normal" _operating levels. Studies conducted eithe r at 
10 
the two-digit industry l evel or with quarterly data have notable advan-
tages in defining standard volwn e . for one , indices of .capacity utiliza -
tion exist ·at the two-digit level. With suc'h estimates, determining 
12 
standard cost is a straightforward procedure. Purthermore, quarterly 
data allow a secular definition of standard volume as a twelve - quarter 
moving average [30] , G14]. Though . both approaches to standardized cost 
have been supported empirically, neither method may b.e directly applied 
here. Utilization r ates are not available at the four-digit level, and 
it is doubtful that the two-digit estimat~s could be extended in any 
meaningful way. The twelve-quarter moving average is also ruled out, 
13 because the data are annual. 
This definitional problem is not insurmountable however. For 
example, Sylos - Labini argues that with annual .data standardizing unit 
costs may not be necessary. He maintains that "for empirica l tests, 
annual . data represents a reasonably good solut i on to the normalization 
problem" (36, p. 6]. Alternatively, Godley and Nordhaus (15] have 
treated annual standard volume as the level of output on the trend path . 
A similar approach is adopted here. Conceptually speaking, this approach 
is closely akin to the twelve-quarter moving average estimat ·e , though 
technically the trend path value will not be as sensitive to structural 
shifts within the period as a moving average. 
The transformations and variables required for the · pri ce equation 
are standard volume, standard unit. variable cost, and inventory-shipments 
ratio deviation . Consider each i~ turn. Annual estimates of standard 
s 
volume (Q ) for each of forty -two i ndu stries are obtained via the 
fo llowing algorithm. · First, an in~ex o( real· output (Q) for the i th 
industry in the jth year is· computed as 
11 
(4) + e.irnv] 
Sl'I ij 
where S = nomi nal value of annual shipments, CiINV = nominal change in the 
value of year- end inventories, SPI = shipments price index, i ~ on e to 
forty-two industries, and j = years from 195 9-1976. Real standard volume 
(Q5 ) for the ith industry .in the jth year is ther-i simply the 
correspondin1 fitted value for real output (Q) obtained by regressing 
output against time. Formally; 
(5) s Q ij - Qif = al+ bl (year) 
where a 1 and b 1 are the OLS estimates obtained from the real output trend 
regression in each industry. 
Standard bn it v~riable cast (UVCs) is a composite of three direct 
cost component s and is written 
UVCsij • r LC + :: + EC] 
L ij 
(6) 
where LC = nominal labor costs, MC = nominal mater'ia l cost, and EC = 
14 s 
nominal energy cost. Si nce Q is based upon the real output index 
derived in (5), any changes in variable expenditures are automatically 
adjusted for both productivity and real output changes. Therefore, the 
uvcs variable accurately captures the influence of input-price changes on 
standard un i t cost . 
Two desirable features of this composi t'e · specification should be 
noted. First, by summing all variable cost components in the numerator, 
any changes in input prices are automatica l ly we i ghted by factor sha res. 
This is importan t because t .he e ffec t of factor price changes on output 
prices depends on both the size o f the former and the in put 's production 
weight ". Output price changes are not costless to the firm and thus it is 
12 
conceivable that the price of a relatively minor input could rise con-
siderably without having a perceptible effect on the price of putput. 
A second notable advantage of the composite specification over the 
individua l variable cost components is that the former more effectively 
considers factor substitutio n that may occur over time due to changing 
relat ive factor prices. For example, r ising ene _rgy costs · might prompt 
increased expenditure on energy-saving labor. If this substitution were 
permanent, linear estimates fitted to separate energy and labor cost 
components might both show larger standard errors than the merged index. 
In short, substitution _between factors in the numerator is internalized 
in the composite specification. 
The demand variable, Inventory-shipments ratio deviation (ISRD), 
is constructed on the premise t hat firms typically rely upon inventories 
for adjustments to short swings in demand. Therefore, excessive changes 
in inventories vis-a-vis a desired buffer level may serve as the principal 
precursor of a demand-induced price change. In fact, · the inventory-
shipments rat io can be a particularly sensitive variable because demand 
conditions affect both the numerat or·and the denominator in a manner 
. . . l 15 
magnifying the appropriate signa. For example, increasing demand will 
simultaneously rai .se shipments and draw down inventories. Both changes 
reduce the value of the ratio. The sign of the partial relation sh ip" 
between price and the inventory-shipments ratio is negative (aSPI/aISR < 
0) . Thi s is noteworthy because it is the reverse of the partial relation-
ship derived graphic~lly in Section III. Therefo re, the contingent 
demand relationship for monopoly pricing previously noted, B2 > 0, is 
simp 'ly revers ed to B2 < 0. This reversal mere_ly reflec ts the mechanics 
of an inventory-shipments ratio. Conceptually, the hypothesis is un-
changed .. 
13 
'· 
The actual demand variable which is used underwent two technical. 
adjustments, though in spirit it retains the i nventory-s hipments concept . 
First, the data for inventories are year - end obse~vptions. ~@ea~~e firms 
o!ten run down their inventories at this time for ac~ounting purposes, 
mid-year estimates may be more representative of year -t o -ye ar demand 
fluctuations. A proxy for mid - year inventories is taken to be ah average 
of two successive year-end inventories. A second adjustment in the 
inventory-~hipments variable . is w,uranted by the fact that roughly half 
of the industries displayed a statistically detectable downward, and in 
fewer cases upward, trend in the inventory - shipments ratio. It thus 
seems more appropriate to cast the demand variable as deviations from the 
inventory-shipments trend line. Therefore, the demand variable uses the 
residuals from the trend regression. 
The final price equation that is estimated is: 
(7) 
where SPI = the shipments price index, uvc5 = unit variable costs at 
standard volume, and ISRD = inventory-sales ratio deviations. 
Before examining the risults, a few caveat~ surrounding the estima -
tion ·of equation ( 7) should be noted .. First, the shipments price indices 
used here are based upon the Bureau of Labor Statistics• producer price 
indices (PPI). This presents a problem if ohe accepts the findings of 
Stigler and Kindahl (36). They maintain that the PPI fails to reflect 
the possible di fference between list prices arid the more relevant trans -
action p ric es . If cor rect, the Stigler-Kindahl conclusion suggests that 
empirical studies will consistently underestimate the impact of falling 
demand· on prices . It is also noteworthy , however, that two more recent 
studies, both interpreting the Stigler - Kindahl data, fail to corroborate 
14 
their f~ndings. Inde8d , Coutts ot al conclude that, "in spection of the 
aggregate res u lts leads ~ne to believe that the Stigler/kindah~ transac-
tion price index shows more signs of stickiness than the official index" 
( 5, p. 71 : Weiss, somewhat less contradictory, simply concludes, "there 
is no signific~nt bias in the two sets o f series with respect to concen -
tr~tion so the studies using BLS series are meaningful" [j7, p. 19) . 
From an econ om.etr ic perspective , the tim~-series na-ture of the data 
raises the issue ot serial coirelatio n. 16 Seria l correlation · proved to 
be a problem in roughly three-quarters of the industry regressions. To 
correct for this pr9blem , a Cochrane - Orcutt ite~ation was performed. 
This procedure proved to be an adequate correction for all but a few 
industries in which the Durb in- Watson statistic remained in the indeter -
. . 17 
minat e region. 
V. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Sect'ion III demonstrated that monopoly pric i ng and mark-up pricing 
can be clearly distinguished in , ·terms of the mode.ls' predicted price 
sens i tivity to changes in variable costs and demand. · The testable 
hypotheses were form ally stated: 
Hl : 0 < Bl < 1 and 82 < 0 + Shared Monopoly 
H2: Bl = 1 and 82 = 0 + Target - Return Pricing 
H3: Bl > 1 and 82 = 0 + Full-Cost Pricing 
where Bl and · 82 refer to the estimated coefficients for the unit variable 
cost and demand -variables in a ·price equ ation . 
Table 1 list s eight industries meeting the conditions of shared 
monopoly as defined in H1 . F.or .eacli industry included in Table 1, 81 
falls significantly between zero and one, and the sign of s2 is appro -
15 
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priately negativ e and oignificant. Generally , the results are of good 
statistical quality. The results in Tab le 1 indicate that roughly 
one-fifth of the tight oligopolies examined in this study approximate 
monopo ly price conduct as defined in H1 . • The results suggest that 
monopoly pricing exists, but it is not s6 prevalent that it disturbs any 
a priori expectation one might have held. 
Table 2 contains the results conforming t(? the general hypothesis of 
mark-up pricing. Included are both target-return and full-cost pricing, 
encompassing both H2 and H3 . These two .results are distinguished within 
the table by reference to the second t-statistic reported under unit 
variable cost (UVCs). 18 The t able reveals that nineteen industries, 
almost half of the sample, are contained within the general mark-up 
category. In all cases, the demand coefficient 82 is insignificant. 
Unit variable ·costs reflect price responsiveness closely paralleling 
either target-return pricing (6 1 = 1) or full-cost ~ricing (8 1 > 1). 
For example, the estimates of 81 for industrial gases, small arms 
ammunition, and motor vehicles show a remarkably clean target-return 
result (8 1 = 1). Regarding full-cost pricing (61 > 1), the ~stimates of 
81 for cane sugar, beet sugar , earthenware utensils, primary copper, 
primary lead, metal cans, vehicular lighting, and electron tubes reflect 
19 
. a "reasonable" percentage mark-up. . Within _the mark-up category _ neither 
target-return (nine industries) nor full-cost pricing (ten industries) 
dominates. 
The results .for the remaining fifteen tight oligopolies in the 
sample are reported in Table 3. These industries all evide nce mark-up 
prici~g in terms of varia ble cost changes (8 1 ~ 1), but they also dis play 
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significant dema nd sen si tivity rn2 < 0). l\n outcome of mark-up pric in g 
with demand sensitivity is not a result that may be associated with 
either pure . monopoly pricing or pure mark-up pricing. Though the simple 
dual proposition did encompass a majority of the industry results (twen ty-
seven of forty - two), roughly .one-third of the industry results suggest a 
third category of mark-up pricing with demand sensitivity • 
. Before interpreting these findings, one general empirical result is 
noteworthy . In th ·e past, . specificatio n of the demand variable, particu-. 
larly with annual data , has . met with les ·s . than uniform success. 20 The 
fact that the ISRD specification reflecte .d · demand influences signifi-
cantly · in twenty-three. industries speaks well for the specification 
adopted in this study. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The focus of this paper has been on developing an empirical test 
that distinguishes two theoretical models of pricing in tight oligopoly. 
Arguably, these two · models represent extremes -- monopoly pricing reflec-
ting pure joint maximization and mark-up pricing reflecting impe rfect 
cooperative conduct. As the results in Tables 1 and 2 reveal, the 
empirical scheme performs well. Roughly one - fifth of the sample indus -
tries r eflect f>Ure · monopoly pricing, and another half appear to be 
mark-up pricers. It is also noteworthy, h6wever, that the test displa~s 
flexibility, identifying a thi r d distinct ca t egory of mark-up pricing 
with demand sens i tivity. 
Furthermore, the t hree observed pricing patterns lend themse l ves to 
plausible interpretation. Bain [1, p. 328) sets the keynote for one such 
interpretation quite clearly: 
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. . . if the firrns of an industry pursue a l'ig1:d margin - adding 
policy- -n lways adding the . sarne uniform ma·rgin to normal · average 
cost ~n order to detcrminr.' price, rega rdl ess bf the cu .r'rent rate 
of output demanded or of other imm~diate market considerations- -
they can generally at best attain only a rough or orude Long-run 
npproximaticn to the piiccs which would maximize joint or separate 
profits. Except under very special limiting conditions of demand 
and cost variation, precise month - to -month or yea r-to-year profit 
maximiza tion (of whatever sort) would require some variation of 
the margin with vjriations in demand and in th~ rate of output. 
However , appropriate choice of a certain rigid margin . is 
potentially quite consistent with a long-run averag,e a·pproxi -
mat iqn to a profit-maximizing price. And if the margins applied 
are indeed varied with varying market conditions, the pricing 
procedure in question is potentially consistent with fairly 
precise maximizing policies. (Emphasis added.) 
Bain' s distinction between "rigid" mark -u ps and those that flo a t with 
demand, and the parallel contrast between "crude long-run" maximizing 
policies versus "fair ly precise" ones, is clearly corroborated by Tables 
2 and J. · ~t the same time , the monopoly price implications revealed in 
Table 1 should not be ignored. Consider the following. 
The pure mark-up policy may repre .sent those industries where com-
plications in implementation or enforcement are particularly severe. In . 
such an environment, the pure mark-up policy reflects the pragmatic 
acceptance among industry members that the probable benefits of a more 
finely honed mark-up policy --i.e., one attuned to demand--are offset by a 
gr eater likelihood that more intricate method~ of coordination may in 
. a· . 1 · 21 fact undermine i ndustry 1.sc1.p 1.ne. In this sense, strict adherence to 
simJ?le mark - up ru les would seem to repr esent Fellner 's concept of "quasi -
agreement" with special force. Mark-up pricing with demand sensitivity 
might then be interpreted as· a better administered collusive effort , 
indeed, a "fairly precise" approximation of monopoly conduct . Clearly, 
thes _e interpretat io ns are consistent with the respective results in 
Tables 2 and 3. However, neither interpretation directly acknowledges 
18 
th e icl1~,1.l, n 11d it : i s .in U 1is n :(i,- 1r d t-.h ul: th ,~ r f'!rrn lt s in Table 1 a re 
rel e va nt. I n o t he r wnrcls , pu r e mark-up pric e rs may do well ,from the 
stan dpo int of jo in t - prof it maximi zati on; ind eed, pe rhaps a s well as 
pos!:d b l:~ giv~n the ir industl'J' erwi f.'1::1Hmen t. But rna rk-:-y~ ~€.i.fi*.:!f f:i §~Rf:ii.t:i-. l:f§ 
to dema nd pr obab l y do be t t er, l eavi ng a few industries that appear to 
appr oximate monopoly performance . Though this interpretation deserves 
further investigation, it is quite compatible with both profit maximizing 
behavior under varying administrative constraints, and the results. 
A. second noteworthy implication of the re sults is that mark-up 
pricing appears to be the pr e dominant price-cost relationship (34 of 42 
industries), but then becomes a dual price pattern depending on the 
significance of demand. The varying influence of demand within the 
general mark-up price patt e rn may represent the distinction between 
short-run ~nd long-r un maximizing conduct in tight oligopoly. As Bain 
notes, mark-ups which "indeed vary'with .market conditions" may be read as 
"fairly precise maximizing policies. ,,. Alternatively, some tight oligo-
polies may focus on long-run profits and thus price to deter entry. 
Where this is the case, it is perfectly cons i stent that "limit" prices 
should not respond to rising demand since to do so might invite entry . 
Cost changes, on the other hand , should .precipitate price changes since 
the limit - pr i ce level will vary directly and .uniformly with cost condi -
tions. I n thi s sense, the results in Table 2 versus Table 3 might be 
viewed as further support for the relevance of the distinction between 
long-run and short - run maximizing behavior in oligopoly . Thus , the 
mark -u p price iesults in general reflect pricing behavior consis t ent with 
profit .maximization under an entry constraint . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Mark-up pricing is a generic term. There are actually several ways 
of formally specifying a model which captures the spirit of mark - up 
pr1c1ng. For example , the terr.is "cos t - plus ," "full-cost," and "tar get - · 
· return'' pricing each imply minor variations within the gene ral mark-up 
theme. F_or · a discussion · of th ese differe nces , see Ec'kst ein and Fromm (7, 
pp. 1165-66) and Ripley and Segal [29, p. 264] . Largely, the .model 
presented here builds upon presentations by Blair (2), [3] and Eckste in 
and Fromm. 
2 Eckstein and Fromm (8, p. 1165 ]. 
3 It is impo r tant to differe ntiate between the factors und erly ing this 
risin g segment of UMC and those shifting t'he entire curve . Consider the 
following example. · A copper wire manufacturer with a 9iven sales expec -
tation normally purchases copper rod in fo rward markets three months 
prior to deliv'?ry for production. Say the firm buys May copper for 
delivery in August. Assume 'now that August wire demand r uns higher than 
anticipated. Any extra production inust occur with materials bought in 
the August spot market, at which -time the price of copper rod is likely 
to have ri sen. As a result, unit costs ris e , but only at near full-
capacity. For all previous units, the lower forw ard materials price 
de termines cost. However ., if the higher spot price is an accurate signal 
of future trends , then forwa rd prices will also rise. It is only in the 
case of higher forward contract prices , · i .e. , permanent price increases, 
tha t the UMC curve shifts. 
4 See Okun [25, pp. 107 -1 14]. 
5 Constant marginal cost over a ran ge has been a common finding in 
many empirical industry studies . As Heflebower states in his review of 
full cost pricing , "There is now significant evidence to the effect that, 
in manufacturing operations at least, marginal costs do not vary for a 
fa irl y wide range of output rates .... Downward from the neighborhood 
of the output for which the plant was designed as much as JO percent .•. 
That marginal costs are horizon tal in this range has been demonstrated 
almost without except1on in statistical investigations ." [18, p.320]. 
Also see Johnston (19]. 
6 This is the major distinction between target-return and full-cost 
pricing that was noted earlier. As will be shown in Section III, this 
difference can be tested empirically. 
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7 Giv<in tha t pric~ is a mark- up on uriit costs, and that unit c.apital 
costs vary wi t h out put, it is obvious th at the dosig~ation of standard 
volume is not an incidental aspect of price determination. Unfortunately , 
the t heory offer s no clear rul e on this po int. While ca s e studies of 
heavy manufacturing have indicated that stand ard vo1'.1me may fall in t he 
r~nqe of 75 to 80 percent capa~ity, broader conside rations would l ead one 
to suspe c t tha t ."norm a l '' utilization levels wi ll vary substantially 
according to the type of indu s try. · However, as a theoretical construct, 
one may assume that it represents 80 p erc ent of p lant capacity. In · 
defense of this ass umption, r ec ognize tha t misspecification of standard 
volume only affects th e initial price level. On balance , howeve r , it 
does ·not alter the model's predictions reg a r ding how that price level 
subsequently responds td either ris i ng cost levels or sh ifts in demand. 
8 It could also depen d on the slope of the marginal cost curve . 
course, as shown here , we are assuming a range of constan t marginal 
c~sts . 
Of 
9 The purest of demand theory is inclin .ed to balk at the notion of 
firms being able to pass cost increases a1ong fully via price increases. 
Okun discusses the likelihood of such pass-throughs at length emphasizing 
the i mportance '.of search cost, transaction cost , and co ntinuity in th e 
buyer - seller relationship (25 , pp . · 138-156]. 
10 Nordhaus [24, p. 38] . 
11 Eckstein and Fromm state, " . .. the adjustment process appears to be 
short, with much of the adjustment coming wi thin three months, most of it 
within six' ' [7 , p~ 1171]. This conclusion is corroborated by slightly 
different evidence fr om a rec e nt study of British manufacturing. Coutts , 
Godley, and Nordhaus found that the e xtremes in the length of production 
periods over which price pol. i cy is likely to be incremented ru n from ni ne 
to twenty - three weeks [5 , pp. 34- 41). 
12 Eckstein and Fromm (7, pp. 1167-69] . 
13 Furthermore, an annual moving avera ge is too cos tly . With only 
nineteen observations, something as small as a three - year moving average 
woul d cost two degrees of freed om. A-dd to this the r equ i red adjustment 
for explanato r y variables and the analysis is down to fourteen degrees o f 
freedom. 
14 Of the f if teen production variables included in the data base , 
energy cost was th e only one for which a complete nineteen year time 
series was not availa ble. Observations were for the years 1958, 1961, 
1963, 196 7, 1971~1976. The r efor e, the missing v alu es in this variable 
were interpolated from t he trend lin e fitted to the available energy 
obse r vations ·. 
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15 There may besom~ concern whctl1cr the magnifying characteristic of 
the inventory-: ;hipments rc:1 tio is desirable. One might contend that this 
impoics a specific~tion - bias in the equation . However, the a uthor 
believes that t he added sensitivity of the ratio is desirable since the 
data are annual ra t her than quarterly. Clearly, detecting d1m~nd in-
01H H1f.;£H1 will b _0 mo re tll ff;l..c:iult w:H :h ntltll.lnl eltH.a for two reasonA1 (l.) 
one has fewer ob s ervations, and (2) the longer period between obser va-
tions suggests that an interim lull in demand could go undetected by the 
data. 
16 Consideration was also given to the possibility of multicolline-
arity. Since the equation involves only two independent variables, their 
simple correlation coefficient provides a sufficient test [20, p. 163). 
The absolut e mean value of the correlation coefficient between WC and 
ISRD was 0.29, indicating the lack of a problem. . s 
17 The alternative correction procedur~ of first-differencing was not 
used here for two reasons. First, first-differencing would have cost an 
additional degree of freedom further reducing the statistical test to the 
fourteen - degree level. Second, first -differences assumes the error term 
correlation (p) is equal to ±1 [27, pp. 110-11). This condition is not 
satisfied in t~e majority of industries. The absolute mean value of p on 
the final iteration was 0.58. 
18 In Table 3, two t - statistics are re po rted. The upper t-statistic 
tests ·whether the coefficient is significantly greater than zero. The 
lower t-statistic tests whether the coefficient is equal to one, or 
grea.ter than one. A single asterisk denotes 81 = · 1, and a double 
asterisk denotes B1 > 1. 
19 A very rough approximation of the mark-up might be de te rmined as 
follows. During the period ·1963-1977, the average after -t ax return on 
stockholders ' equity for manufacturers with assets over $1 billion was 
12.5 percent [30, p . 92). A corporate profit tax rate of 49 percent 
implies that the pre-tax return would be roughly twice the stockh older 
return thus in the vicinity of a 25 percent mark-up. Again, this a very 
crude estimate, but given the aggregated nature of the data, perhaps a 
rough approxi~ntion is appropriate. · 
20 See Nordhaus (24 , pp. 41 -4 2). 
21 As Scherer notes , "Poorly coordinated efforts to increase short -run 
profits. under changing and uncertain demand and cost conditions can, 
through shortsightedness and misinterpretation, deteriorate into moves 
and countermoves that reduce rather than increase group profits." ( 30, p. 
188) • 
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/\PPEN{)JX 
S/\1·\Pl ,E OF TIGIIT OT,TGOPOLIESl 
Four - Finn 
Industr ies SI C Number Concentration covP.rage 
Code of Firms RaHo Ratio 
- ··~· .. ==.. 
Cereal Break fas t 
Food s 2043 34 90 84 
Wet Corn Milling 2046 26 63. 97 
Cal'le Sug~r 
Re~ining 2_ 2062 22 60 98 Beet Sugar 2063 16 60 100 
Chewing Gum 2067 15 87 88 
Malt 2083 30 48 99 
Cigarettes 2111 13 84 100 
Tire Cord ·and 
Fabric 2296 9 84 97 
Pressed and ~olded 
2646 Pulp Goods 3 32 85 97 Industrial Gases 2813 105 72 92 
Cellulosic Man -
made Fibers . 2823 12 96 95 
Organic Fibers, 
Noncellulosic 2824 36 74 97 
Carbon Bl ack 2895 11 74 95 
Flat Glass 3 4 3211 11 92 95 Glass Containers' 3221 27 80 99 
Vitreous China 2 Food Utensils 3262 .32 60 88 
f j :,e Earthware 2 Food Utensils · 3263 17 60 97 
Gypsum 3275 44 80 97 
Minera l Wool 3296 66 75 93 
Electrometallurgical 
Products 4 3313 27 74 87 Primary Copper 3331 11 80 98 
Primary _ Lead 3332 12 93 98 
Prima ry Zinc 3333 11 66 70 
Primary Aluminum 3334 12 91 76 
Aluminum Sheet, 
Plate , a~d Foi l 3353 24 6 5 99 
Metal Cans 3411 134 90 98 
Small Arms 
Ammunition 3482 57 89 98 
Carbon and Graphite 
Products 3624 58 86 98 
House hold Refrig-
erators , Freezers 3632 30 85 85 
Household L~undry 
Equipment 3633 20 83 91 
Household Vacuum 
Cleaners 3635 34 75 85 
Sewing Machines 3636 72 84 93 
23 (continued) 
Al' l'l·:tlD I Y.-- C<>rtl I 1111(;11 
Four-rirm 
Industries SIC Number Concentration Covera9e 
Code of Firms Ratio Ratio 
Vehicular Li~hting 
t~rJu A t,ilile fl 1;. )1347 46 78 91\ 
Telephone, Tele-
graph Apparatus 3661 157 94 99 
Electron Tubes , 
Receiving Type 3671 21 89- 94 
Cathode Ray TV 
Picture Tubes 3672 69 83 98 
Primary Batteries, 
Dry and \';et 3692 30 85 98 
Motor Vehicles and 
Car Bodies 3711 165 96 10 0 
Aircraft Engines, . 
Engine Parts 3724 189 77 94 
Guided Missiles, 
Space Vehicles 3761 23 62 95 
Space Propulsion 
Units, Parts 3764 22 59 87 
Tanks and Tank 
Components 3795 18 99 77 
Photographic 3 Equip., Supplies 3861 555 80 96 
Hard Surface Floor 
Coverings 3996 18 91 99 
1 An industry is considered a tight oligopoly depending on either of 
two structural conditions. One , the four - firm concentration ratio must 
exceed 75 perscent . This cirterion is consistent with Palmer's [26) . 
finding that a proclivity for collusion appea red to set in for CR4>70 percent. Also, until the revision in June of 1982 , a CR4 greater than 75 percent was groun<:ls for den ying a horizonal merger under the Justice 
Depa rtmen t Merger Guidelines of 1968. An alter native condition for 
inclusion in the sample is that the number of firms in the industry be 
less than thirty-fiv e . The selection of thi~ figur~ was largely a 
function of the data. Analysis of the number of firms across industrie.s 
r evealed a clear lapse between thirty-five and f,i.fty firms. Therefore, 
thirty-five was selected as the ceiling . The dAta on CR4 and the number 
of firms are those for 1972. These 1972 statistics will thus be defining 
the sample for the errtire 1958-1976 period. Obviously, then, a substan-
tial degree of structural stab ility is being assumed for this period. 
However , empi rical studies of concentration trends in manufacturing 
support this assumption. See Scherer (30, pp. 67- 74). 
2 Products are considered substitutes and thus the market definitions 
are too narrow. Following Qualls [28) ,the CR4 is weighteq average across 
substitute markets. 
3 Product class is too broadly defin ed . Adopted Shepherd's (33) 
adjusted CR4 . 
4 Markets are regional. Adopted Shepherd's (33] adjusted CR4 • 
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